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NOKIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The research question of this thesis is “how can Nokia’s lobbyists influence EU decision-making?” Nokia is used as a case study. We can assume that Nokia can lobby the EU in several ways. Therefore, the question focuses on the “how.” The goal is to study Nokia’s EU lobbying model. The material consists of articles, a study and books, as well as e-sources and interviews. With regard to Nokia, the material is subjective. The company of Nokia was chosen for this thesis because Nokia is both a global and Finnish company. It is a success story and a source of pride for Finns. Telecommunication and mobile technology are interesting sectors because they represent fast-growing industries. Nokia established an EU office in Brussels in 1993. Nokia’s head of the EU office explains that their main goal is to monitor the EU’s legislative activities, provide expertise to EU institutions and perform advocacy. Nokia’s EU office also supports Nokia whenever possible, e.g. with EU grants or project funding. For Nokia, the central EU lobbying channels are the European Commission, the European Parliament and Nokia’s own EU office. The findings of the interviews seem to be well in line with the theory. Both emphasised the use of EU institutions in EU lobbying. Theorists drew attention to associations. Companies can use e.g. BusinessEurope or other business associations to lobby the EU. This research can also be modified to a deeper level, and Nokia’s EU lobbying model can be used by other companies or industries as well.

Key words: Nokia, EU, decision-making, companies, lobbying.

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FOREWORD

Particularly and first of all, I want to thank my interviewee Kaisa Olkkonen from Nokia. She is the core of this project.

Secondly, I owe a big thank you to my supervisor Tapio Raunio, to Pekka Nurminen (European Parliament) for his ideas, to Helena for her mentoring, to my father Reijo for his support, to Hannu, to my godfather Pekka for his brainstorming, and to Kari Kähönen. And to so many others as well!

This has been a true learning process. Most of all, I have learned patience and time management.

Espoo 17.4.2019

Linda Snellman

“Nokia is a global leader in creating the technologies

at the heart of our connected world”



(Nokia corporation.)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BIA	Business Interest Association
ERT	European Round Table of Industrialists
DGs	Directorates-General
MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
MNCs	Multinational companies

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. MOTIVATION OF TOPIC

The research question of this thesis is “how can Nokia’s lobbyists influence EU decision-making?” Nokia is used as a case study. Nokia can lobby the EU in several ways. Therefore, the question focuses on the “how.” The goal is to study Nokia’s EU lobbying model. The material consists of eight interviews, articles, a study, books, PowerPoint slides (Corporate EU lobbying, how to lobby effectively? Kaisa Olkkonen, Nokia, 2014) and several e-sources. Books of Nokia’s history were also read by Häikiö, Ollilla and Siilasmaa (Häikiö, 2002; Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013; Siilasmaa, Fredman & Päckilä, 2018). The Nokia material is subjective.

Why Nokia?

The company of Nokia was chosen for this thesis because Nokia is both a global and Finnish company. It is a success story and a source of pride for Finns. The telecommunication and mobile technology sectors are interesting because they represent fast-growing industries. I got the idea for this thesis when attending an EU lobbying seminar organised by the European Parliament’s information office in Helsinki (2015). There, Kaisa Olkkonen demonstrated how Nokia lobbies in the European Union. Nokia established an EU office in Brussels already in 1993. Nokia’s head of the EU office has explained that their main goal is to monitor the EU’s legislative activities that can affect Nokia, provide expertise to EU institutions and perform advocacy. Nokia’s EU office also supports Nokia whenever possible, e.g. with EU grants or project funding.

1.2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The topics of this thesis, such as EU lobbying and Nokia, can be studied from various angles. Hence, the following scholars are included.

Klüver, Braun & Beyers (2015) and De Bruycker (2015) have studied interest groups in EU legislative lobbying. Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall (2015) ask “when does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy-making in the EU?”

Three EU institutions as EU lobbying channels are presented. First, Coen & Richardson (2009) and Greenwood (2011) study lobbying the European Commission. Secondly, Kluger (2015), Hauser (2011) and Coen & Katsaitis (2015) discuss the European Parliament as a lobbying venue. Also, lobbying activities towards the Council are given a short presentation by Greenwood and Hauser.

Associations are discussed. For example, Greenwood has brought up BusinessEurope and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as examples of EU business associations. Additionally, Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat (2017) have studied national and international business interest associations (BIAs). Two examples of BIAs are the Confederation of Finnish industries (EK) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Nokia receives help from all these associations.

Corporate lobbying in the European Union is discussed by Bouwen (2015) and Tenbücken (2002). Bouwen introduces access goods, which can give access to EU institutions. For example, Nokia can offer expert knowledge (EK). Tenbücken has researched the EU lobbying strategies of multinational companies (MNCs). The orthodox strategy is introduced. Nokia is used in this example on account of it being an MNC.

Finally, Kautto (2009) has published an article, “Nokia as an Environmental Policy Actor: Evolution of Collaborative Corporate Political Activity in a Multinational Company”. In the article, Kautto investigated three cases of environmental policy preparation: 1) the RoHS/ WEEE Directives; 2) the EuP Directive; and 3) the IPP pilot project on mobile phones, in which Nokia was active during the preparation of all the directives.

The theoretical material is objective, since it looks at EU lobbying from a general perspective. Kautto has not worked at Nokia.


1.3. EU DECISION-MAKING

New decisions are being constantly made in the EU. As the process is not well known, I will clarify it.

Firstly, before proposing laws, the European Commission (EC) estimates their possible economic, social or environmental effects. This happens by conducting Impact Assessments, which look at the advantages or disadvantages of the options.

Additionally, the EC usually consults non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local authorities and representatives of industries and civil society. Various experts provide guidance to the EC on technical issues. Hence, the EC guarantees that legislative proposals respond to the needs of those with the most concerns.

Businesses, citizens and organisations can participate via the website or other venues for public consultations.



(You and Europe.)

Negociations = negotiations

Kenealy, Peterson and Corbett (2015) have explained the EU decision-making. It is based on the Treaty of Lisbon. Here is a short summary:

- ✚ The Commission produces a draft of the legislation and sends it to the Parliament and the Council for viewing.
- ✚ The Parliament and Council discuss the draft separately and may propose changes.
- ✚ If a specified majority in each institution reaches agreement, the proposal is accepted.
- ✚ If an agreement has still not been reached between the Council and Parliament, a conciliation committee is convened to find a compromise.
- ✚ If no agreement can be reached at this stage, the proposal is rejected.

(Bomberg, Peterson & Corbett, 2015: 122)

The following EU institutions are central in EU decision-making and will be studied in this thesis. Their tasks are presented here.

1. COMMISSION



(European Commission.)

Proposes laws for EU legislation. The European Commission's political leadership consists of 28 Commissioners. Administrative work is undertaken by its staff, which is organised into departments called the Directorates-General (DGs). The DGs each handle a particular policy area. Before proposing new laws, the Commission makes impact assessments, which examine the economic, social and environmental impacts of the law proposals. Requests and input from the public or stakeholders can be made via public consultations. (European Commission.)

2. PARLIAMENT



(European Parliament.)

The European Parliament works in two main stages: A) Committees and B) Plenary sessions. A) Committees: the Parliament has 20 committees and two subcommittees. They each take care of a specific policy area. Committees prepare legislative proposals. In the committees, MEPs and political groups can suggest amendments or reject bills. B) Plenary sessions: EU legislation is passed during the plenary sessions. MEPs gather at Strasbourg to vote on the proposed legislation. (European Parliament.)


3. COUNCIL



The Council of the European Union is discussed here. It is the voice of the EU member countries. It adopts EU laws and coordinates EU policies. The members of the Council are government ministers from each EU country. They handle different policy areas. (Council of the European Union.)

1.4. NOKIA

WHERE IT ALL STARTED



Nokia has a fascinating history. It goes like this: A Finnish engineer named Fredrik Idestam founded a wood pulp mill in Southern Finland in 1865. Having seen the possibility of an increased demand for pulp products, he opened another mill on the river of Nokianvirta. This inspired him to name the company Nokia AB. During the 1960s, Nokia was involved in several businesses, including rubber, cable, forestry, electronics and power generation.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE PHONES



(Nokia Corporation.)

Things changed. European telecommunications were faced with deregulation in the 1980s. At this time the GSM (global system for mobile communications) was introduced. The very first call using a Nokia phone was made in 1991. Subsequently, Nokia decided to focus on telecommunications and mobile phone technology while divesting its other businesses. By 1998, Nokia was the world's leading mobile phone company. This success continued over a decade.

NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORKS AND MICROSOFT

In 2007, Nokia, together with Siemens Network, created a joint venture (combining telecoms infrastructure operations). A few years later, Nokia bought the share of Siemens in NSN. Then Microsoft came into the picture. This happened in 2011. The main reason for these actions was because Nokia wanted to bolster their position in the smartphone business.

ALCATEL-LUCENT


Purchasing Alcatel-Lucent has made Nokia the forerunner for innovating new technology and services. This has been strengthened by Bell Labs (research).

NOKIA TODAY

My case study regards the current Nokia:

1. TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS AND SERVICES. 2. HEALTH CARE SOLUTIONS. 3. LICENCES AND PATENTS. 4. BELL LABS (RESEARCH).

HERE YOU CAN SEE HOW NOKIA HAS DEVELOPED.



(Nokia Corporation.)

1.5. THESIS OUTLINE

This part explains the structure of the thesis. There are five chapters. Chapter 1 contains the introduction. There, the research question, case study (Nokia), previous research, EU decision-making and Nokia are presented. Chapter 2 is the theoretical part. This part explains EU lobbying, interest groups, the Commission, Parliament and Council as lobbying venues, business associations, corporate lobbying and, finally, Nokia as an EU actor. Chapter 3 discusses the method and research material. Chapter 4 is the analysis, where the results from the interviews are compared with theoretical findings. Chapter 5 concludes the results of this thesis and discusses future research.

2. THEORY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This is the theory of the thesis. It presents the findings of various scholars. The topics are EU lobbying, using the Commission, Parliament, Council and associations as EU lobbying channels, corporate lobbying of multinational companies and Nokia as an EU actor.

2.2. EU LOBBYING

This part explains EU lobbying. Lobbying can be defined in various ways.

Hauser has defined it as the following: "Lobbying is generally defined as the attempted or successful lobbying of legislative-administrative decisions made by public authorities through the use of interested representatives." (Hauser, 2011: 682)

This thesis uses this definition.

Hauser has also presented the history of EU lobbying. There are two paths, the “national route” and “Brussels lobbying,” that can be recognised. They are presented here.

A. NATIONAL ROUTE (1957-1987)

This route includes using national channels, such as the Council or permanent representation of EU member states (COREPER), for example. Following the 1957 Treaty of the European Community (TEC), European interest groups mainly lobbied Brussels, targeting member state governments and leveraging unions, trade organisations and professional associations to access national representatives. This was due to the European Community's weak political mandate and the ability of member states to veto legislation in the Council of Ministers. Recognising this participatory deficiency, the Commission's 1988 Cecchini Report sought active participation from business interests in EU governance.

B. BRUSSELS LOBBYING (1987-1999)

The 1987 Single European Act (SEA) was the first revision of the TEC, establishing Europe's goal of a single market. Hence, lobbying activity shifted from national to European channels. Hence, the Commission estimated that by 1992 there would be over three thousand active public and economic lobbies in Brussels. "Where power rests," argued political scientists, and "lobby is brought to bear." The Europeanisation of lobbying was led by economic integration and the increasing role of the EU. With the SEA and 1993 Maastricht Treaty, national governments moved regulatory functions to European institutions, expanding the EU's competencies in the single market, product quality, health, safety, employment, competition law, environmental standards, industrial policy and consumer protection. Demanding access to Europe's policymaking process grew as EU institutions showed significant competencies. Additionally, Maastricht broadened policy domains so that the Council could make decisions via qualified majority voting (QMV) (Hauser, 2011).

2.3. INTEREST GROUPS

This section deals with interest groups in EU legislative lobbying. Several researchers have studied this topic. Interest groups can be companies, for example.

De Bruycker (2015) explains that interest groups supply information to policy-makers, which develops an expertise-based relationship between the two groups. He conducted 143 interviews with lobbyists who were active in making 78 legislative proposals sent to the European Commission. In general, information can be seen as a ‘currency’ in expert-based relationships. Policy-makers face complicated problems and therefore they search for expertise. They lack relevant information on the policy proposals and have little time to gather the data. This is why policy-makers need to use external sources such as interest groups (Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2010).

Figure 2.3.1. describes the mean predicted probabilities of supplying technical and political information by various interest groups. Those that make contact with the European Commission have a mean probability of 0.75 (S.E. =0.01) (standard error) for offering technical information, and the ones that target the Parliament have a probability of 0.51 (S.E. =0.02). The validity of the finding (technical information) will be further investigated. De Bruycker concludes that interest groups mostly supply technical information in EU legislative lobbying.




FIGURE 2.3.1. (De Bruycker, 2016: 611)

Dür, Marshall & Bernhagen (2015) have researched interest group success. They ask “When does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policymaking in the EU?” Business interests aim to constantly lobby public policy in the EU. For example in 2012 and 2013, internet companies such as Facebook and Google massively lobbied the EU institutions in order to make changes to a data protection directive. According to the authors, business actors in the EU tend to lose out when seeking to accomplish desired policy outcomes. To a large extent, EU legislative proposals handle market regulations, which businesses generally oppose. Hence, businesses rise up in opposition whenever the European Commission publishes new proposals for legislation (Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall, 2015).

Moreover, Klüver, Braun & Beyers (2015) have studied interest group lobbying in the European Union. The authors took part in the INTEREURO project. Essentially, as the authors claim, some legislative proposals are simple and clear, while others are complex as they deal with extremely technical matters. Therefore, the European institutions constantly seek external expertise due to the small amount of staff they have compared to the EU’s policy competences. Usually, interest groups that are experts in their fields are welcomed. What is interesting is that the authors expect that the size and resources of policy-specific lobbying coalitions have important consequences for EU interest group politics (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Bunea, 2013; Klüver, 2013a, 2013b).

2.4. COMMISSION

The European Commission is a central EU lobbying institution. Coen and Richardson (2009) have found that “early lobbying” applies especially to the Commission, because it sets the agenda of the EU legislative process (Gardner, 1991:65; Nonon and Clamen, 1991; Hull, 1993:82; Buholzer, 1998:276; Majone, 1994). The Commission exercises its powers by implementing and supervising EU policies. The Commission wants to be in contact with lobbyists because it needs external resources to execute its institutional role. In order to comprehend how private interests lobby in the Commission, it is important to understand the exchange relation between the Commission and private interests (Bouwen, 2002:368). Private interests can be companies. External expertise is necessary when the Commission is drafting legislative proposals. Lobbyists can have access to the Commission if they can provide expert knowledge on specific policy proposals.

Table 2.4.1. shows the lobbying activity of interest groups in the Commission's Directorates-General (DGs). We can see that business interests mostly contact the Enterprise DG (currently DG GROW). It develops policies in business and industry. This is a significant place for companies to lobby (Coen & Richardson, 2009).

COMMISSION AND INTEREST GROUPS









TABLE 2.4.1. (Coen & Richardson, 2009: 24)

Humanitarian = Humanitarian (ECHO)

COMMISSION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The European Commission engages with civil society and its individual components, like companies, for example. Greenwood (2011) has described this interaction:

-  Briefing of all legislative initiatives in a yearly work programme.
-  A consultation plan is published. The consultation can be open or expert groups, workshops and forums can be used.
-  The consultation plan is part of a larger impact assessment, which is based on legislative proposals. This makes the process transparent. All the evidence used for the drafting of the proposal is shown. The evidence becomes the basis for a public debate, where interested participants can take part. Often, organisations make their own impact assessments. During this process, the evidence is challenged and the key concepts of the legislative proposal become clearer.
-  A Green Paper represents a 'thinking aloud' instrument of consultation. When it is done, a White Paper consults details of the policy options.
-  Finally, the last legislative proposal from the Commission contains a statement, which describes the consultation procedures taken. This includes a presentation of the responses given. It should also have the Commission's own responses, which show why a particular decision was made or ignored.

(Greenwood, 2011:34)

2.5. PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament is also relevant in lobbying. Hauser (2011) stresses that the Parliament has become a central lobbying venue. It does not have a “built-in majority,” which has resulted in coalition-building and consensus decision-making. Every year 70,000 individuals contact the European Parliament. However, many meetings between MEPs and lobbyists are confidential. MEPs search for industry expertise due to the complex issues that the Parliament deals with. According to an Italian MEP, lobbyists can supply information to the MEPs in a “clear fashion.”

PARLIAMENT AS A LOBBYING VENUE




FIGURE 2.5.1. (Hauser, 2011: 696)

Kluger (2015) has examined business lobbying in the European Parliament. She argues that the Parliament has become a central lobbying venue due to its increased regulatory powers. Her goal is to research the conditions that help business groups shape Parliament's policy outcomes. In order to accomplish this, she has conducted a comparative case study design on four recent legislative dossiers, conducted process tracing of EU documents, looked at lobbying letters and done 145 interviews. Kluger emphasises that the greatest lobby belongs to the powerful MEPs (rapporteurs). They take on a leadership role in their own political group on specific dossiers. When lobbying, interest groups must take into account all MEPs that are "foes, friends or fence-sitters" (Marshall, 2010). (Rasmussen, 2015)

The European Parliament (2015) has published a study on special interest representation written by Katsaitis and Coen. They confirm that the Parliament is being increasingly lobbied. The data of the study is based on an email survey. For example, MEPs were asked: "How often are you contacted by different types of groups?"

Chart 2.5.2. explains this. We can see that the European Parliament is frequently or very frequently contacted by companies (52%).




CHART 2.5.2. (Coen & Katsaitis, 2015)

2.6. COUNCIL

Greenwood (2011) has studied the Council. He argues that the Council is an institution where no lobbying takes place. The Council sees to it that contacts with lobbyists and NGOs is taken care of by the European Commission. The committee of permanent representatives, or “COREPER,” can be a useful lobbying target. Finland has a Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels; e.g. Nokia can contact them if necessary. Contrary to the Commission and Parliament, the Council needs less information from private actors. This is because it can receive information from national and local governments instead. Finally, integrating “fresh input” is difficult at the end of the EU decision-making’s cycle. This decreases the powers of the Council as a place to lobby. During the time when proposals come to the Council, only a small amount of issues can be debated (Greenwood, 2011).

2.7. ASSOCIATIONS

Various associations such as BusinessEurope and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) can help companies influence EU decision-making. Nokia uses both of the aforementioned associations.

They are presented here.


BUSINESSEUROPE



(BusinessEurope.)

BusinessEurope is the leading organisation for growth and competitiveness at the European level. It works for companies in Europe and campaigns for entities that centrally lobby their business. BusinessEurope speaks for all-sized enterprises in 35 European countries.

ERT



(The European Round Table of Industrialists.)

The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) brings together 55 chief executives and chairmen of multinational companies with a European parentage. The ERT handles a wide range of industrial and technological sectors.

Associations can be business associations, for example. Greenwood (2011) has presented EU business associations.

From table 2.7.1. we can see that BusinessEurope spends 50% more on lobbying than the ERT.

EU BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

ORGANISATION	BUDGET	EXPENDITURE ON LOBBYING	NUMBER OF STAFF
AMCHAM-EU	€2,217,000	€400,000-450,000	23
BUSINESSEUROPE	Undisclosed	€550,000-600,000	45
ERT	Undisclosed	€300,000-350,000	7
EUROCHAMBRES	Undisclosed	≥€ 1,000,000	27
UEAPME	€1,643,200	€1,561,000	32
TOTAL		€3,811,000	134

TABLE 2.7.1. (Greenwood, 2011: 76)

UEAPME = THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF CRAFT, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES

AMCHAM-EU = AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

EUROCHAMBRES = ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

BUSINESS INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS (BIAs)

There are also national business interest associations (BIAs). Kohler-Koch, Kotzian and Quittkat (2017) have studied these. One example of a BIA is the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), with whom Nokia works. The article of Kohler-Koch, Kotzian and Quittkat tests hypotheses grounded on a dataset regarding BIAs from France, Germany, Poland and the UK. According to the analysis, BIAs that have a good financial capability (such as BusinessEurope), a sufficient level of representativeness and multisector capabilities have the best probability of access to the EU. For example, the organisation called ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) has a good level of representation. Nokia is active at ICC Finland. Importantly, the more that BIAs can offer information to decision-makers, the easier it will be to gain access to them. The authors make an interesting argument: The larger the domain of the association is, the likelier it is that it can offer general information on economic policy effects and present broad views on behalf of the business world. However, associations that represent only certain sectors are less able to offer this, but they can be specialised in technical knowledge, however (Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat, 2017).


In the following passages, the ICC and EK are given a short description.

ICC



ICC Finland is one of the 90 national committees of the global ICC network. They aim to work for the interests of their members in order to facilitate international trade.

EK



(Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto.)

The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) is the leading business organisation in Finland. The EK works daily with EU institutions such as the Commission, Parliament and Council of the European Union. It wants to ensure that the voice of Finnish companies is heard in EU decision-making. The EK monitors and influences EU regulatory projects that affect businesses.

2.8. CORPORATE LOBBYING

Multinational companies (MNCs) like Nokia influence EU decision-making. This can be called corporate lobbying.

Tenbücken (2002) has researched the EU lobbying strategies of MNCs. One of these is the “orthodox strategy,” which is described in chart 2.8.1. The chart has been modified by me, and the examples of Nokia, the EK, ERT and BusinessEurope are added.

THE ORTHODOX STRATEGY




CHART 2.8.1. (Tenbücken, 2002: 128)

Bouwen (2002) has also studied corporate lobbying in the European Union, and in his research he introduces the concept of “access goods.” These are goods which can provide benefits to EU policy-makers and grant access to EU institutions for supplier companies. According to Bouwen, expert knowledge (EK) is an access good that includes expertise and technical know-how. This is crucial information for effective EU legislation. He emphasises that EU member state administrations do not have this kind of expertise. They do have technical know-how, but they are “too far away from the market.” Nokia can probably offer “expert knowledge (EK).”

There are three access goods:

1. Expert Knowledge (EK)
2. Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)
3. Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)

(Bouwen, 2002)

2.9. NOKIA AS EU ACTOR

This part studies Nokia as an environmental policy actor in the European Union. It is one example of Nokia's EU lobbying.

Kautto (2009) has studied three cases of environmental policy preparation: 1) RoHS/ WEEE Directives; 2) the EuP Directive; and 3) the IPP pilot project on mobile phones. Nokia was active in the preparation of all the directives.

Kautto found that Nokia's staff participated in the European Commission's meetings and workshops. NOKIA's "top management" was in close contact with European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and his cabinet (DG ENTR). The contacts with the cabinet were well used by Nokia, the European industry associations and other MNCs like Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Philips. They collaborated with Nokia to gain access to the cabinet. In addition, bilateral meetings were held between Nokia and the Commission. These were organised with a particular purpose of finding a consensus within industry associations. This collaboration continued during the co-decision procedure of the Council and the Parliament. Interestingly, the first reading in the European Parliament was made by the rapporteur Astrid Thors, a Finnish MEP. In fact, her previous assistant had worked for Nokia's EU office in Brussels. Kautto concludes that Nokia chose to use several channels instead of one as a way of lobbying the EU, with the main venue being the EICTA (European Information and Communication Technology Association). Currently that venue is DIGITALEUROPE (Kautto, 2009).

SUMMARY OF NOKIA'S EU ACTIONS:

- Early acting.
- Multi-level lobbying.
- Lobbying the European Commission.
- Constructive feedback.
- Ad hoc coalitions.
- Personal contacts with the Commission.

(Kautto, 2009: 121)

RoHS /WEEE Directives = Restriction of Hazardous Substances / the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment

EuP Directive = the Energy Using Products

IPP pilot project = Integrated Product Policy

2.10. CONCLUSION OF THEORY

We can conclude that, according to the theory, the following EU lobbying channels are the most central ones:

1. **COMMISSION:** The Commission wants to be actively in contact with lobbyists, because it needs external resources. External expertise such as the use of companies is necessary when the Commission makes legislative proposals.
2. **PARLIAMENT:** The Parliament is a central lobbying venue because it has extensive regulatory powers. Companies should contact the powerful MEPs, or “rapporteurs.”
3. **ASSOCIATIONS:** BusinessEurope and the ERT can help companies with influencing EU decision-making or accessing EU institutions. BusinessEurope speaks for all-sized enterprises in 35 European countries. The ERT also brings together 55 chief executives and chairmen of multinational companies with European parentage and handles a wide range of industrial and technological sectors. Nokia works closely with both associations.

3. METHOD AND RESEARCH MATERIAL

3.1. CASE STUDY

The case study method is presented here. It is widely used in social sciences. Yin (2003) has examined case study research methods. According to him, every research strategy has advantages and disadvantages. They depend on the following things: a) the type of research question, b) the investigator's control over events, and c) a focus on contemporary phenomena. Usually, the case study method can answer the question of "how." In this, the researcher has little control over events and is focused on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. To Yin, the case study is a strategy that contributes knowledge about groups as well as social and political phenomena. Here, the groups can mean companies.

According to Yin, the following are central to case studies:

- (1) The study question.
- (2) Proportions.
- (3) Unit of analysis.
- (4) Logic of linking the data to proportions.
- (5) Criteria for interpreting results.

For this thesis they are:

- (1) How can Nokia influence EU decision-making?
- (2) "How" and "EU decision-making."
- (3) Nokia.
- (4) Categories.
- (5) Analysis.

(Yin, 2003: 21)

3.2. DATA

The research material (data) consists of eight interviews along with the perspectives of scholars who specialise in the topics. The interviews were conducted face-to-face or by Skype in 2016 and 2017. The transcribed interviews can be seen in the appendices. I chose to conduct interviews because an interview is interactive communication with people. For me this was the best method to conduct the research.

There are several forms of interviews. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) have studied qualitative research interviewing. To them, an interview is a conversation that has a structure and meaning. One of these forms is “interviews with elites,” which in my case suits best. Elite interviews are made with leaders or experts. This thesis used leaders from Nokia and other expert institutions (the EU and University of Helsinki). Kvale and Brinkmann emphasise that an elite’s thoughts are best interviewed through a conversation when an interviewer has previous knowledge of the topic. This happened in my case as well. I had studied Nokia and EU decision-making before I started the interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

3.2.1. INTERVIEWEES

The interviewees are described in this chapter. Their identities were kept anonymous. They are referred to as P1, P2, P3, P4, P8, P5, P6 and P7. Their workplaces and tasks are presented here:

NOKIA

P1 = previous EU representative

P2 = head of EU office

P3 = head of governmental relations

P4 = worked as Nokia's EU advisor

P8 = previous head of EU office

EU

P5 = European Commission

P6 = European Parliament

UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

P7 = EU researcher


3.2.2. SAMPLING

These persons were chosen for the interviews because they are leaders or experts in their field. Few of them were previously familiar to me.

3.2.3. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The interview questions are presented here. They are semi-structured, meaning they are open and broad. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) have studied semi-structured questions. The authors argue that these questions usually aim to provide a meaning to a certain phenomenon. In this thesis the meaning of “how” is studied. However, there are also challenges with open and broad questions. I noticed that it leads to extensive answers. It can be difficult to find the relevant information for your research question. Despite this, I believe that open questions provide space for spontaneity. For this reason also, categorising was chosen as a method to logically divide the results from the interviews and theory (these are explained in Chapter 4 “analysis”) (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

This figure illustrates the interview questions:



4. ANALYSIS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This is the analysis of the thesis. In order to accomplish this, I have chosen categorising, because it is used in the case study method. All the answers of the interviewees and scholars are placed in their respective categories. The aim is to find answers to the research question “how can Nokia influence EU decision-making?” Categorising helps me receive consistent results. The same logic is used for every category. First, the interviewees’ answers are studied, followed by those of the theorists. Finally, both answer groups are compared and the main conclusions are reached. In total, there are five general categories which all companies can use to lobby the EU. Since the case study of this thesis is Nokia, Nokia’s EU lobbying model is studied at the end of the analysis (section 4.7.).

4.2. CATEGORIES

These are the general categories which were chosen because they are the most relevant EU lobbying channels based on theory and interviews.

4.3. COMMISSION

4.4. PARLIAMENT

4.5. COUNCIL

4.6. ASSOCIATIONS

4.7. EXPERTISE INFORMATION SHARING

4.8. NOKIA’S EU LOBBYING

This is not a category. Instead, it presents how Nokia lobbies the EU.

4.3. COMMISSION

SUMMARY. To P5, P1, P2, P3, P4, P8, De Bruycker (2015), Coen & Richardson (2009) and Kautto (2009), the European Commission is a central lobbying venue. P7 and De Bruycker have found that the Commission requires technical information from lobbyists because the Commission prepares EU directives. As the issues that policy-makers face are complex, relevant expertise and know-how is needed from the industry. The Commission also lacks the necessary time for gathering data, hence the use of external sources such as interest groups. These can be companies, for example. According to P3 and Kautto, the European Commissioners are helpful when lobbying. Coen & Richardson and P5 noted that the Commission's Directorate-Generals (DGs) have high political power and hence should be lobbied.

Nokia and the Commission are studied in section 4.8.1.

DGS/CABINETS. P5 explains that the Commission should be lobbied before Parliament, since the Commission formulates laws. To P4, all lobbying should happen early in the process, meaning usually a year in advance. P7 emphasises that the Commission appreciates technical knowledge.

Coen & Richardson (2009) argue that the Commission wants to be in contact with lobbyists because it needs external resources. This expertise is necessary when the Commission is drafting legislative proposals. Additionally, the Commission consults various private interests to receive broad views in order to ensure its legitimacy as well as support for its legislative proposals. They also use committees when formulating policies. The committees have become an important venue for private interests. Importantly, the Commission's DGs often communicate with private interests (Mazey and Richardson, 1997:183; Nugent, 2001:108; Christiansen, 2006:108). Table 2.4.1. by Coen & Richardson (presented in Chapter 2 "theory") shows that businesses mainly contact the Enterprise DG (today DG GROW), which develops policies in business and industry. This is a significant place for companies to lobby (Coen & Richardson, 2009).

Interestingly, De Bruycker (2015) has made 143 interviews with lobbyists who have been actively making 78 legislative proposals sent to the European Commission. The result was that, in general terms, information can be seen as ‘currency’ in expert-based exchanges. The Commission does not possess the relevant information for the policy proposals. Because they also have little time to gather the needed data, they are driven to use external sources such as interest groups (Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2010). Figure 2.3.1. in theory describes the predicted probabilities of supplying technical and political information by various interest organisations. Those that make contact with the Commission will most probably offer technical information (De Bruycker, 2016).

Kautto (2009) studied Nokia’s activity in the preparation of the RoHS/ WEEE Directives, the EuP Directive and the IPP pilot project on mobile phones. He learned that Nokia participated in the European Commission’s meetings and workshops. Most importantly, Nokia’s “top management” was in close contact with the Finnish European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and his cabinet. Nokia and the Commission also held bilateral meetings (Kautto, 2009).

4.4. PARLIAMENT

SUMMARY. P6, P8, P2, P4, P3, P7, Kluger (2015), Hauser (2011) and Coen & Katsaitis (2015) agree that the European Parliament is a central venue for lobbying. As Kluger emphasises, this is due to Parliament’s increased regulatory powers, among other things. The greatest lobby belongs to the powerful MEPs (rapporteurs). Coen has argued that the Parliament needs technical information in a similar fashion as the Commission, because MEPs need to understand topical issues and problems very broadly. Coen & Katsaitis have found that 52% of companies contact the Parliament.

Nokia and the European Parliament will be studied in Chapter 4.8.2.

MEPs. According to P6, the European Parliament is an important lobbying channel. Companies should consider the Parliament’s role in the “right way and time.” Overall, companies should think about how they bring out their opinion and ideas for better regulation regarding e.g. competition positions or improvements for internal markets. If companies find clear faults in existing EU laws, as for example in the case of Nokia, they should reveal these flaws to Finnish MEPs. Hence, when the EU laws are being drafted, the fresh ideas of the companies won’t be new to stakeholders. This is called the pre-lobbying phase, where the Parliament is central. Therefore, this phase is crucial for effective lobbying.

The next phase is the preparation of EU laws. Though this work mainly belongs to the Commissions, the Parliament's role should not be forgotten in this phase either, because it can affect the type of preparations that are made. Overall, companies should contact MEPs and Parliament's specific committees. "Bargaining chips" should be put forth in the Parliament, since the Commission usually looks at the pre-phase of EU law-making. For companies, it is important to understand how EU decision-making is done. For example, multinational companies either have the know-how or they can hire the necessary expertise.

According to P7, roaming charges, among other issues, has been a difficult topic to explain. Various stakeholders see that this is true. To lobbyists, MEPs only understand how much one costs by x and y amounts. There is a targeting problem here, as lobbyists seek to lobby yet cannot turn their lobbying into an understandable language. P7 explains that there is an assumption that the Commission needs more technical information and MEPs need it less. Hence, for companies, it is easier to contact the Commission and citizen organisations. However, David Coen has argued that it is not exactly so. Today, the Parliament has become an important actor in the legislation process and they also need technical information. Usually, Commission officials work on certain topics, while MEPs have to understand various problems broadly. P7 questioned whether MEPs have the resources to accomplish such a thing.

4.5. COUNCIL

P3, P2, P1, Greenwood (2011) and Hauser (2011) mentioned the Council. Greenwood has emphasised that the committees of permanent representatives (COREPER) can be a useful channel for lobbying, as they can raise significant issues for the Council of Ministers, which needs less information from private actors. Hauser argues that the European Council is the conciliator of disputes and makes strategic decisions on Europe's future. Together with the Parliament, the Council has "veto power" on legislation by co-decision and can finalise the EU's budget (Greenwood, 2011; Hauser, 2011).

Nokia and the Council are studied in section 4.8.3.

4.6. ASSOCIATIONS

4.6.1. INTRODUCTION

This category is broad because there are national, European and global associations. A few examples of business associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT, ICC and EK are presented in Chapter 2 “theory”. Associations can help companies influence EU decision-making.

SUMMARY. P1, P4, P8, P2, P7 and Greenwood (2011), Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat, Klüver (2017) and Braun & Beyers (2015) consider associations to be central in EU lobbying. Greenwood has mentioned the European business associations BusinessEurope and ERT. From table 2.5.1. (presented in “theory”), we can see that BusinessEurope spends 50% more on EU lobbying than the ERT. Additionally, BusinessEurope conducts everyday lobbying while the ERT focuses on strategic matters. According to Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat, the national business associations (BIAs), with their good financial capability, level of representativeness and multisector capabilities, have the best access to the EU. Kohler-Klüver, Braun & Beyers argue that it is usually interest groups that are experts in their fields that are welcomed. Klüver adds that those interest groups which belong to a bigger lobbying coalition have a better chance to influence EU decision-making (Greenwood, 2011; Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015; Kohler-Koch et al., 2017).

P7’s empirical analysis studied multinational chemical companies and interviewed their Heads of European Affairs. These companies could be compared to Nokia. P7 asked them how much they collaborate with other chemical companies. Surprisingly little, was the answer. P7 added that “If I represented a chemical company, I would try to create coalitions with others.” P7 contacted BusinessEurope. The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) was also singled out. Finally, P7 asked the question “When the legislation has been conducted, what is the role of Nokia? Is it lobbying through DIGITALEUROPE?” P7 also mentioned Eurooppanuoret. Nokia could use their help as well.

EUROOPPANUORET RY (JEF FINLAND)



(Eurooppanuoret ry (JEF finland))

P8, P2 and P1 say that associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT and DIGITALEUROPE are important for Nokia. BusinessEurope and the ERT are presented in Chapter 2 “theory”.

DIGITALEUROPE



(DIGITALEUROPE – the voice of digitally transforming industries in Europe.)

Nokia and associations are studied in section 4.8.4.

4.7. EXPERTISE INFORMATION SHARING

P7 discovered that expertise required for lobbying is highly challenging.

MNCs. Tenbücken (2002) explains that multinational companies (MNCs) which lobby the EU often have EU public affairs staff helping them monitor political developments. Nokia, for example, has its own EU office in Brussels. Early stage involvement is important, especially when the Commission is drafting the initial proposals. The Commission wants to act objectively, and MNCs use Euro-associations to avoid strict regulations (Tenbücken, 2002).

Bouwen (2002) argues that expert knowledge (EK) includes expertise and technical know-how. This is crucial information for effective EU legislation. To him, EU member state administrations do not have technical expertise. They do have technical know-how, but they are “too far away from the market” (Bouwen, 2002).

Dür, Marshall & Bernhagen (2015) have argued that in the EU, business actors on average tend to lose out when seeking to accomplish desired policy outcomes. Generally, business actors oppose EU legislative proposals on market regulations. Hence, businesses rise up in opposition whenever the Commission publishes new proposals for legislation (Dür et al., 2015).

Expertise information sharing is central in Nokia’s EU lobbying model. Nokia utilises their expertise in various ways. This is described in section 4.8.5.

4.8. NOKIA'S EU LOBBYING

4.8.1. NOKIA AND COMMISSON

Based on the interviews, Nokia utilises the Commission in a remarkable fashion. In the opinion of P4, one should lobby the Commission early. Before a law proposal comes up, the Commission is thinking about it, making consultations, outlining different options and making impact assessments of these options. This is quite necessary in order to understand the gravity of the issue. In this, stakeholder groups such as the civil society (e.g. companies) and NGOs are important in the process. P4 explains that this is the time to get organised and collect all the available data and evidence that there is. Policy-makers need this information in order to see how the proposals impact society, economy and public health. Interestingly, P2 thinks that “real good decision-making” only happens if the Commission is well informed. The Commission needs to know what is happening in the industries they want to address. Hence, they consult players such as businesses. For example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, Nokia will want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly applies principles such as accountability. P2 also stresses that since the Commission develops law proposals, it is important to talk to them in an early stage (usually a year in advance). This way, lobbying is easier.

P1 adds that the Commission can also be approached directly. P1 emphasises that the EU legislative process starts when the Commission publishes a Green Paper. Interested parties are then invited to submit comments. As a rule, the Commission does not deal with specific company issues, as the Commission prefers to receive position papers submitted by organisations representing the industry.

Finally, P3 notes that the Estonian Commissioner, Andrus Ansip, who is responsible for the EU's Digital Single Market, has been helpful in understanding the “Nordic view.”

4.8.2. NOKIA AND PARLIAMENT

For Nokia, the Parliament is also an important EU lobbying channel, but in a different way than the Commission. MEPs play a key role for Nokia, and Nokia needs to work with the ones who are relevant. The following information summarises Nokia's answers regarding the Parliament. P4 explains that Nokia has been following the Parliament for a long time and knows the MEPs well regarding matters of copyright or frequency. There are many MEPs who understand these issues and together they form the Parliament's opinion for these matters. The political element must also be taken into account. Arguments must be constructed on a European framework. Companies cannot tell MEPs arguments that only support the companies' own interests; they must also provide arguments that benefit the whole European industry or competitiveness. P4 states that the Parliament's agenda must be followed; the earlier you act, the better it is, and it is central to find the MEPs that have the "pencils in their hand."

P3 mentioned that the Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri works with the roaming issue. P3 also describes lobbying as producing data and understanding it. With regard to MEPs, there is a general concept that lobbying is something unclear. However, this is not true. It is more about telling clear messages and making good policies.

To P2, it is not easy to explain one's views to a large audience. To ease up the process, there are rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the Parliament. Nokia cannot talk to every MEP; it has to search for the relevant MEPs of its field.

4.8.3. NOKIA AND COUNCIL

The results show that, for Nokia, the Council is not that relevant in EU lobbying. However, Nokia works with Finland's Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels (COREPER). P1 says that they have many experts in various fields. P3 also mentioned COREPER and other national channels for lobbying (see e.g. chart 2.8.1. in "theory").

4.8.4. NOKIA AND ASSOCIATIONS

Based on the results, business associations are a remarkable lobbying channel for Nokia, and the company uses them broadly. Nokia has not only used associations, it has been actively creating new ones. According to P8, if daily presence is not possible, one has to be active in one's own European "umbrella" association. Nokia actively works with DIGITALEUROPE, BusinessEurope, ERT, EK, ICC Finland and the European Digital Media Association (EDiMA).

To P4, one must think about the message you want to convey and find the right group for doing that. Once the message has been found internally within the expert group, it has to be taken to the trade associations. Usually, groups aim to make a proactive proposal together. Also, P2 says that trade associations are important for Nokia. It serves as an additional channel for them, where Nokia can introduce their interests and they can hear various viewpoints from others.

To P4, all channels are important in order to have a coordinated position between many organisations. At least one year before the proposal is put in place, companies gradually move towards the trade and industry associations to defend the position of the industry and make the company's message the prevailing one. The messages have to include the stake for innovation, economic development, environment and social aspects. P4 emphasises that, in general, the message is more effective when it is sent through the "big channels," which will provide more impact.

According to P1, when seeking to enhance the voice of the EU electronics industry, the Nokia office was instrumental in merging several EU associations for telecom, consumer electronics and components into one association: The European Information and Communication Technology Association (EICTA). Nokia participated in the board of the association and in many working groups. EICTA was later renamed DIGITALEUROPE. P2 also says that it is always good to discuss and have a joint position on important matters.

4.8.5. EXPERTISE IN INFORMATION SHARING

Nokia is an industry leader in telecommunications and uses this position when influencing EU decision-making. Bouwen (2002) presented the concept of “expert knowledge” (EK). Nokia can truly offer this to EU institutions such as the Commission and Parliament, particularly with regard to technical matters.

4.8.6. EU OFFICE

According to P1, deregulation of the European telecommunication industry started in the 1990s. Competition rules were also implemented at this time, which was challenging to Nokia and its competitors. To follow up more closely on the liberalisation of the telecom industry, Nokia established its EU office in Brussels in 1993. Having an office of your own is one of many options when lobbying the EU. As the legislative process in the EU usually takes years, establishing a company office in Brussels may therefore be justified. It is obviously not the cheapest alternative, but – in combination with other means – it may be the most efficient one. Ideally, for an EU representative, it is important to know the industry in question, the company you work for and how the institutions of the EU function. A background of technical and/or legal studies is obviously helpful. A key instrument for the EU Office was Nokia’s large database for Commission papers, association position papers and other relevant documents. Nokia could then quickly access information and forward it.

4.8.7. OTHER NOKIA-SPECIFIC EU LOBBYING FACTORS

P1 says that Nokia has participated in an EU research programme. In the 1990s, Finland was regarded as the “laboratory of the telecommunication industry.” Hence, Nokia was often consulted in various telecom issues. P1’s role often involved finding the key issue-owners within Nokia and getting them to participate in hearings in Brussels. Nokia also prepared a number of written opinions. The Nokia positions were regularly discussed at the Head Office in meetings with a “Future Watch Team” consisting of experts from all divisions. After a few years in Brussels, Nokia added another secretary and two issue managers to focus on copyright matters and consumer and environment policy. Altogether, P1 spent ten years representing Nokia in Brussels. P3 says that Nokia invites several partners to Finland to whom they offer data on ICT matters. Often, Finland can show a good example, and usually the “Finnish voice” wants to be heard. Though Nokia’s home is in Finland, Nokia is not Finnish. The message of the company must be directed to everyone. It must be clear and right. To P3, “lobbying is about communicating.” It is a task that must bring value to the audience, which comes “on top of the data.” P2 emphasises that Nokia wants to do good and be a sustainable company. Nokia wants to be really on top. It wants to make sure that the EU provides common rules that make sense.

4.8.8. CONCLUSION

This section has explained Nokia's EU lobbying model. Based on the results, these entities are the most relevant to Nokia, in order of importance:

1. COMMISSION

- Nokia is utilising the Commission in a remarkable fashion.
- "Real good decision-making" happens only if the Commission is well informed.
- The Commission needs to know what is happening in the industries they want to address. Therefore, they consult players such as businesses. For example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, Nokia will want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly applies principles such as accountability.
- The Commission develops law proposals, and therefore it is important to talk to them in an early stage. This way, lobbying is easier.
- The Estonian Commissioner, Andrus Ansip, who is responsible for the EU's Digital Single Market, has been helpful in understanding the "Nordic view." (P3)
- Former Finnish European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen has been important to Nokia.

2. PARLIAMENT

- MEPs play a key role for Nokia and Nokia needs to work with the relevant ones.
- Companies cannot tell MEPs arguments that only support the companies' own interests; companies must also provide arguments that encourage the whole European industry or competitiveness.
- The Parliament's agenda must be followed; the earlier you act, the better it is, and it is central to find the MEPs that have the "pencils in their hand."
- The Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who works with digital and technology issues, is important to Nokia.

3. EU OFFICE

- Nokia has an EU office in Brussels.
- Nokia can work closely with the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.
- The office helps Nokia follow EU legislation activities close by.
- Nokia can provide expertise to the EU institutions.
- The EU office can find EU grants or project funding for Nokia.

5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

5.1. SUMMARY

The chapters of this thesis will be revised shortly.

Chapter 1 is the introduction, where the thesis topic is explained. The research question “how can Nokia influence EU decision-making?” and the case study of “Nokia” is explained. Additionally, previous research, the EU decision-making process and Nokia’s story is presented. The thesis structure is also clarified.

Chapter 2 is the theory, which presents the findings of scholars on EU lobbying and interest groups, with the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the European Union examined as lobbying routes, in addition to describing business associations, corporate lobbying and Nokia as an EU actor.

Chapter 3 shows the method and research material. It describes the chosen research method, which combines the case study “Nokia” and interviewing. The categorising of the results is described. The research material “data” includes eight interviews and findings of scholars who are specialised in the topic.

Chapter 4 analyses the interview results and compares them with theoretical perspectives.

Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the research question. Other possible options and future research are discussed in this chapter.

5.2. FINDINGS

These conclusions are based on theory and the results of the interviews.

Based on the analysis, no clear controversies can be found between scholars and case study interviews. Though both emphasise the role of the Commission and Parliament, the importance of associations and own EU office was not stressed in the theory. These two channels are important for global high tech companies like Nokia, which operate in a highly regulated industry.

The justification for the order of importance is the following:

1. COMMISSION

The European Commission is the most relevant lobbying venue. The Commission requires technical information from lobbyists because of its role in proposing EU legislation. As the Commission lacks the time to gather data, it needs external sources like companies. European Commissioners can be helpful when lobbying. The Commission's Directorate-Generals (DGs) have a lot of political power and should therefore be lobbied. When lobbying the Commission, the companies must contact them early enough before the legislative proposals go further to the Parliament and Council.

2. PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament is an important lobbying venue because of the Parliament's increased regulatory powers. As a lobbying channel, the Parliament is second to the Commission. Due to the Commission's role in drafting proposals, it might be too late to start lobbying the Parliament if one wants to influence legislation. This is valid especially in the case of Nokia. Like the Commission, the Parliament needs technical information because MEPs have to understand issues and problems very broadly. According to statistics, 52% of companies contact the Parliament. This number is clear evidence that the Parliament is an important lobbying channel. If companies can see clear faults in existing EU laws, as e.g. in the case of Nokia, they should reveal those flaws to the relevant MEPs. Hence, when the EU laws are being drafted, the fresh ideas of the companies won't be new to stakeholders. Companies should also contact Parliament's specific committees. "Bargaining chips" should be put forth to the Parliament, since the Commission usually looks at the pre-phase of EU legislation. Though there are contradictory aspects to Parliament's role as a lobbying channel, its legislative powers have increased since the Treaty of Lisbon.

3. ASSOCIATIONS

Associations are a significant EU lobbying channel. This channel is third in importance after the Commission and Parliament on account of those entities being direct lobbying channels, which means that they cannot be ignored. Associations are an indirect lobbying channel representing various members. For example BusinessEurope and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) can help companies with EU lobbying. BusinessEurope uses roughly 50% more expenditure on EU lobbying than the ERT.

The national business associations (BIAs), with their good financial capability, level of representativeness and multiple sectors, have the best access to the EU. One example of a BIA is the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), which works closely with EU institutions. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is also well represented globally. Those companies which belong to a bigger lobbying coalition have a better chance to influence EU decision-making.

5.3. NOKIA

This section represents the relevant EU lobbying channels for Nokia. These conclusions are based on the interviews with Nokia:

1. COMMISSION

Nokia utilises the Commission strongly. It seems that Nokia does not ignore the Commission, and therefore it is the most important EU lobbying channel for the company. Here is a strong argument from one interviewee: “Real good decision-making happens only if the Commission is well informed.” The Commission needs to know what is happening in the industries they want to address. Therefore they consult players such as businesses; for example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, Nokia will want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly applies principles such as accountability. Since the Commission develops law proposals, it is important to talk to them in an early stage. This way lobbying is easier. Another interviewee mentioned that the Estonian Commissioner Andrus Ansip, who is responsible for the EU’s Digital Single Market, has been helpful in understanding the “Nordic view.” Erkki Liikanen also aided Nokia greatly in working within the EU.

2. PARLIAMENT

The Parliament is also a strong channel, but it comes second to the Commission. MEPs play a key role for Nokia and the company needs to work with the relevant ones. Companies cannot tell self-serving arguments to MEPs that only support the company's own interests. They must provide arguments that encourage the whole European industry or competitiveness. The Parliament's agenda must be followed; the earlier you act, the better it is. It is central to find the MEPs that have the "pencils in their hand." The Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who works with digital and technology issues, is important to Nokia.

3. EU OFFICE

It is uncommon for all companies to have an EU office. Nokia, on the other hand, has dedicated resources to focus on EU lobbying and they accordingly have an EU office in Brussels. Because of this, Nokia can work closely with the Commission, Parliament and the Council. The EU office helps Nokia follow EU legislation activities up close. Hence, Nokia can provide local expertise to the EU institutions. Nokia's EU office can search for EU grants or project funding for Nokia.

4. OTHER NOKIA ASPECTS

Nokia collaborates with associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT and DIGITALEUROPE.

The following quotes present other aspects:

- "Lobbying is about communicating. It is a task that must bring value to the audience, which comes on top of the data." (P3)
- "Nokia wants to be a sustainable company and really on top. It wants to make sure that the EU provides common rules that make sense." (P2)

Nokia places great importance in offering technical expertise in EU decision-making and it is one of the leading actors in ICT and mobile technology.

5.4. FUTURE RESEARCH

5.4.1. RESEARCH QUESTION

The topics of this thesis were broad. When considering future research, some narrowing of the topics could be done with the research question. For example, in this thesis only one EU institution, the European Commission, could be thoroughly studied. This is because the Commission seems to be the most relevant EU lobbying channel in this particular research, as e.g. Nokia works closely with the Commission. This is relevant to the EU lobbying of research companies, which are a central interest group in the EU decision-making.

5.4.2. METHOD

The method of case study and interviewing was useful for this research. However, it would have been possible to condense the interview questions. The questions could be a mixture of multiple choice and standard questions. This could make it easier to categorise and compare the findings. The interviews could also be shorter, with a maximum allotted time of 15-30 minutes, because the transcription process is quite slow. The more data you have, the more it takes time to search for the essential answers and conclusions.

5.4.3. OTHER IDEAS

Other companies could make use of this thesis and its results, like start-up or environmental technology companies, for example. The structure of this thesis could be used. If companies study this thesis, they could choose the focus areas adapted to their industry.

Even though this thesis focused on Nokia, the findings appear to be relevant for many other companies as well. The size and industry of the company determines its EU lobbying model.

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APPENDICES

<p>EU:</p> <p>HOW CAN COMPANIES INFLUNCE EU DECISION-MAKING?</p>	<p>NOKIA:</p> <p>HOW CAN NOKIA INFLUENCE EU DECISION-MAKING?</p>	<p>UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI:</p> <p>HOW CAN ASSOCIATIONS HELP COMPANIES INFLUENCE EU DECISION-MAKING?</p>
<p>P6: "The Parliament is one channel of lobbying. (Companies) should consider the Parliament's role in the right way and time."</p>	<p>P4:</p> <p>These are central according to her:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) How to organise yourself (the processing). 2) How to think about the message and find the right group for doing that. 3) When you have found the message internally within your expert group, you take the message to the trade associations. 	<p>P7: "It depends on whether you are a lobbyist of a (whole) industry or an NGO."</p>
<p>P6: "A big company has greater power to lobby than a smaller one. However, the rules are the same for all lobbyists, organisations or Member States."</p>	<p>P4: "Many companies have an office in Brussels. This is the place where the Advisor would be. Like with Nokia."</p>	<p>P7: "The empirical section of my research is concentrated in chemical companies, which are multinational companies. I think that they can be compared to Nokia."</p>
<p>P6: "(Companies) must think how they will bring out their own opinion. What kind of ideas they</p>	<p>P4: "You need to clarify the life of the marketplace for the policy-makers. In Brussels, the</p>	<p>P7: "When I interviewed the Heads of European Affairs, I tried to ask how much they were</p>

have for better regulation, regarding e.g. the competitive position or improvement of internal markets.”	conversion of the messages happens there.”	cooperating with other chemical companies. Surprisingly little, was the answer. If I represented a chemical company, I would try to create coalitions with others.”
P6: “If the company sees clear faults in the existing EU law, for example in the case of Nokia, it is good to reveal these flaws to the Finnish MEPs. This way, when the EU laws are made, the fresh ideas of the companies are not new (to the stakeholders). This is the pre-lobbying phase, where the Parliament is important. This is an effective channel to lobby.”	P4: “The groups together have a proactive proposal. This can have a positive impact and provide a better chance for lobbying the outcome in the end. In the trade associations, it is not always the proactive position which wins; instead, it is often the scaring or slowing down of messages that goes forward. In these kinds of questions, you have the ones that get engaged and the others that oppose.”	P7: “What came out was an organisation named CEFIC. I was also in contact with BUSINESSEUROPE.”
P6: “The next phase is where the EU laws are drafted. This is mainly the Commission’s work. However, the Parliament’s role should not be ignored in this phase either, because it can affect the kind of preparation that is made.”	P4: “All this (lobbying) should happen early in the process. This way, the decision-makers who are crafting the proposals are prepared at least a year in advance. Before a proposal is to come up, the Commission is thinking about it, making consultations, outlining different options and making impact assessments. This is all necessary in order to understand the gravity	P7: “I believe that the thing that can be problematic for the chemical companies and perhaps for Nokia as well is that the industry is very specialised. The matters that they drive forward are extremely detailed.”

	<p>of the problem. Various stakeholder groups, such as the civil society and NGOs, are involved in the process. The member states are particularly important, of course, because they usually implement the EU rules.”</p>	
<p>P6: “The companies should be in contact with MEPs and specific committees. For Nokia, a multinational company, this is not a problem, since it is not afraid to speak in different languages.”</p>	<p>P4: “This is the time to get organised, to start collecting all kinds of data and evidence that is available. This is needed for all the policy-makers and the data options include impact on society, the economy and health issues. Part of the data comes from the industry or the Commission asks for studies from different consultancies. During the year, there is an evidence collection. It is important for companies to be part of this in order to submit their views, to be part of the preparatory stage.”</p>	<p>P7: “For me, what has been meaningful to discover in the interviews and material is that the expertise needed for lobbying is highly challenging.”</p>
<p>P6: “Bargaining chips should therefore be put forth to the Parliament. The Commission is clever and looks at the pre-phase that has been done for the EU lawmaking.”</p>	<p>P4: “The message is more effective when it is done through big channels. This gives a better impact.”</p>	

<p>P6: "For companies, it is important to understand how the EU decision-making is done. This is not a problem for Multinational Companies that either have the know-how to do this or can hire expertise."</p>	<p>P4: "All channels are important in that state, to have a coordinated position between many organisations. This spans the life cycle of an Advisor, at least a year before the proposal is put in place. It is the internal face of the company, gradually moving towards the trade and industry associations and defending the position of the industry and making your company's message the prevailing one. This is the first battle. Also, to simplify the message, to tell what is at stake for innovation, economic development, the environment and social environmental aspects."</p>	<p>P7: "I read an article of the telecommunications industry about roaming charges. They had asked various stakeholders how they see the lobbying of the issue. From a lobbyist's perspective, it is difficult to explain to MEPs what it is about. To lobbyists, MEPS only understand how much one costs by x and y amounts. There is a targeting problem here, since lobbyists seek to lobby but cannot turn it into an understandable language."</p>
<p>P5: "The Commission is the first place to lobby. The Commission prepares the files before anything goes to the EP."</p>	<p>P4: "When the proposal comes out, you can only do a part of them as an Advisor. You can only do an x amount of meetings in a day; as the audience is broad, you need to be part of a bigger effort, of companies and organisations that convey the same message, therefore you have to rely on quite a lot of people there."</p>	<p>P7: "Nokia can lobby if they are able to offer the information that policy-makers are missing."</p>

P5: "The Commission listens very carefully to all the stakeholders, and especially the cabinets are a very political and important place to lobby."	P4: "Even when companies have an office in Brussels, sometimes they hire extra (help) in order to be able to cover a bigger audience at the same time, because these things go on intensely for over a year or longer."	"P7: If we think about the EU institutions, the European Commission appreciates more technical knowledge because they have to draft a directive or act."
P5: "The companies should contact the Commission at every level. The proposals are prepared in the DGs and those are the first places to lobby. The cabinets also play a very important role."	P4: "As an Advisor, you first get organised, then discuss the key points with your experts about what you want to convey. In your industry you have a specialised language to form the position in your industry. The role of the Advisor is to push the simplification of the message, to not let the technical jargon take over, otherwise the message will be weaker. You have to help the policy-makers save time, to get to the point very quickly, otherwise it will be difficult for them to grasp your point."	
	P4: "Nokia has followed the Parliament for a long time and knows the MEPs well, regardless whether the matter is about copyright or frequency. There is a	P7: "If you know how to argue why something works better, all the better."

	<p>good amount of MEPs who understand the issues, and together they construct the Parliament's opinion for these matters."</p>	
	<p>P4: "Of course, there is also the political element that we must take into account. The argument must be built within a European framework. The companies cannot only tell self-serving arguments to the MEPs to support their own interest, they have to emphasise the European industry or competitiveness in their argument."</p>	<p>P7: "There is a general assumption that the Commission needs more technical information and MEPs need less. This way it is easier for companies to contact the Commission and citizen organisations. David Coen has argued that it is not exactly so. Now that the Parliament has become an important actor in the legislation process, they need technical information in a similar fashion."</p>
	<p>P4: "You must follow the Parliament's agenda; the earlier you act, the better. You have to find the MEPs that have the pencils in their hand. It is important for the company to tell their view to the media in order to make the lobbying easier."</p>	<p>P7: "On the other hand, a Commission Official works in a certain field. MEPs have to understand widely various matters. Do they have the resources to perceive?"</p>
	<p>P3: "The reason why I went to Brussels in the beginning is that the power of the citizens is limited. Member States can of course lobby, but when things</p>	<p>P7: "When one thinks about Eurooppanuoret (JEF-FINLAND) and Nokia regarding issues such as roaming charges, then this is perhaps not the place to lobby for Eurooppanuoret. However, in</p>

	start, the role of the Commission is very big.”	matters such as the role of NOKIA and its position in Finland, it could be more useful.”
	P3: “Our company’s EU relations are dealt through our office in Brussels.”	P7: “As a Legal Researcher, I am interested to look at lobbying, which is based on technical details, which usually happens when the legislation has already been drafted. This is the part that is least known to us. For this reason I am interested in your thesis. When the legislation has been done, what is the role of NOKIA? Is it lobbying through an organisation such as DIGITAL EUROPE?”
	P3: “We invite different partners to Finland to whom we offer data on ICT matters. Finland is a good example and the Finnish voice wants to be heard.”	
	P3: “The Estonian Commissioner Andrus Ansip has been responsible for the EU’s Digital Single Market. It helps that he has understood the Nordic view.”	
	P3: “The best channel is to be in contact with the staff that prepares the initiatives.”	

	P3: "Nokia's home is in Finland, but we are not Finnish. We have a strong presence in France and Germany. Depending on the matter in question, Finland has a good lobby in digital matters."	
	P3: "For example in roaming issues we have a Finnish MEP, Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who works with digital and technology matters."	
	P3: "If we think about the preparation of the Council, we have the national channels for lobbying."	
	P3: "Every stakeholder is our client, but we see them as specific persons. The message of the company must be directed to everyone. It must be clear and right."	
	P3: "I believe that lobbying is producing data and understanding this. If we think about MEPs, there is a general concept that lobbying is	

	<p>something unclear. However, this is not true. It is about providing a clear message and making good policy.”</p>	
	<p>P3: “Lobbying is about communicating.”</p>	
	<p>P3: “My short experience from Brussels is that I have rarely heard that there has been too much lobbying. On the contrary, the political and official staff wants to hear opinions.”</p>	
	<p>P3: “Lobbying is a task and it must bring value to the audience, which comes on top of the data.”</p>	
	<p>P2: “Real good decision-making can only happen if the Commission is well informed. They really need to know exactly what is happening in the industries they want to address. The way to do this is to consult the players such as businesses.”</p>	
	<p>P2: “What we (Nokia) do in the EU: we are here to see what the Commission is developing and we inform the company about it. We</p>	

	try to help the Commission make good legislation.”	
	P2: “We want to do good, to be a sustainable company. We want to be really on top. We want to create the best possible results for the environment and for sustainability.”	
	P2: “For example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, we want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly apply principles such as accountability.”	
	P2: “We want to make sure that the EU provides common rules that make sense.”	
	P2: “We use the position papers to show our interest and we have our own meetings. We meet the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), Political Advisors and the Permanent Representation of the Member States in Brussels.”	
	P2: “We are part of the most important trade associations. This is an additional channel for us, because it can be more efficient to show our interest and it also	

	provides different points of views from others.”	
	P2: “It is always good to discuss and have a joint position on important matters.”	
	P2: “The Commission develops the initial proposals and therefore it is important to talk to them in an early stage. This way, lobbying is easier.”	
	P2: “It is difficult to explain your views to a large amount of people. That is why you have the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. You could never talk to all the Members of the European Parliament. You (have to) look for the relevant MEPs in your field.”	
	P1: “Although Nokia was already present in almost every EU country, the deregulation of the telecom markets provided new business opportunities. In order to follow up more closely on the liberalisation of the telecom industry, Nokia established its EU office in Brussels in 1993, ahead of Finland’s membership of the EU in 1994.”	

	<p>P1: "Having an office of your own is one of many options when lobbying the EU. Finland's Permanent Representation to the European Union has many experts in various fields. European industrial associations provide another source of information along with a possibility to lobby EU legislation."</p>	
	<p>P1: "Law firms and consultants are available for specific issues. The Commission can also be approached directly."</p>	
	<p>P1: "However, the legislative process in the EU usually takes years. Establishing a company office in Brussels may therefore be justified. It is obviously not the cheapest alternative, but – combined with other means – it may be the most efficient one."</p>	
	<p>P1: "Ideally, for an EU representative, it is important to know the industry in question, the company you work for and how the institutions of the EU function. A background of technical and/or legal studies is obviously helpful."</p>	
	<p>P1: "Before opening its office in Brussels, Nokia had participated</p>	

	in the EU Research Programme, in allocating frequencies on an international level in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and in setting European standards within the <i>Standardisation Institute</i> for Telecommunications (ETSI)."	
	P1: "A key instrument for the EU Office was our large database of Commission papers, association position papers and other relevant documents. We could then quickly access and forward information."	
	P1: "The EU legislative process starts when the Commission publishes a draft document they call a Green Paper. Interested parties are then invited to submit comments."	
	P1: "As a rule, the Commission does not deal with specific company issues. Instead, the Commission prefers to receive position papers submitted by organisations representing sectors of industry."	
	P1: "To enhance the voice of the EU electronics industry, the Nokia office was instrumental in merging several EU associations	

	for telecom, consumer electronics and components into one association: The European Information and Communication Technology Association (EICTA). Nokia participated in the board of the association and in many working groups. EICTA was later renamed DIGITAL EUROPE.”	
	P1: “In the 1990s, Finland was regarded as the ‘laboratory of the telecommunication industry.’ Hence, Nokia was often consulted in various telecom issues.”	
	P1: “My role (as an EU Representative) was often to find the key issue-owners within Nokia and get them to participate in hearings in Brussels. Nokia also prepared a number of written opinions.”	
	P1: “The Nokia positions were regularly discussed at the Head Office in meetings with a Future Watch Team consisting of experts from all divisions.”	
	P1: “After a few years in Brussels we added another secretary and two issue managers to focus on copyright matters and consumer and environment policy.”	

ESKO AHO




FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT

ESKO AHO
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Main Building
D10b

October 13, 2017
11-13 o'clock

**LEADERSHIP FOR
CHANGE LECTURES**

This event was organised at my university, where I was present.

Esko Aho has worked for Nokia for many years.

AURA SALLA



“Finns cannot lobby in the EU,” says Aura Salla.

You can read the article at: <https://www.talouselama.fi/>